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VOL. XVII. APRIL, 1919 No. 6
THE DOMICIL OF PERSONS RESIDING ABROAD
UNDER CONSULAR JURISDICTION
,T HE domicil of persons living under consular jurisdiction in
foreign countries presents a problem of unique importance,
not only because of the concern which a large number of peo-
ple have in its proper solution, but also because of its relation to the
conception of domicil and to the requisites by which the existence
of donricil is to be determined. This problem may be concisely.
stated in the form of a question as follows: Is it possible for a
person residing abroad under consular protection to acquire a dom-
icil of choice in the country of residence? There are no apparent
obstacles to the acquisition of such a domicil, and on superficial
consideration it would seem that the question might be readily
answered in the affirmative. The question has been answered in
the affirmative after careful consideration, in the only Am-
erican cases in which the precise point has been -raised., The
English courts, on the other hand, seem to be fully committed to the
contrary view. The Court of Appeal has decided, in the recent case
.of Casdagli v. Casdagli,2 that a British subject cannot acquire a
domicil of choice under such circumstances. The conflict of judi-
cial opinion thus presented may be approached most advantageously
through a preliminary consideration of the antecedents of the
English rule.l
There are several factors of which account must be taken if one
is to understand the difficulty which the English courts have ex-
perienced in arriving at a solution of the problem. In the first
place, there has always been a rather deeply rooted judicial pre-
judice against the notion of Christian domicil in heathen lands.
IN re Allen's Will, United States Court for China, Term at Shanghai, August, x9o7,
in i American Journal of International Law 1029; Mather v. Cunningham, xo5 Me. 326
(19o9).
2 87 L. J. P. 73 (x17).
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Lord Stoivell's famous dictum in The Indian Chief with iegard to
the immiscible character of European settlements in the Orient 3 has
been quoted many times. Dr. Lushington declared in Maltass v.
Maltass that "every presumption is against the intention of British
Christian subjects voluntarily becoming domiciled in the dominions
of the Porte. '"4 More recently, in the case of The Derfflinger (No.
i), it has been asserted that "the waters of Alpheus still flow un-
defiled, and where European Powers enjoy the privilege of ex-ter-
ritorial jurisdiction their subjects never lose their native charac-
ter." The importance of this factor cannot be measured with ex-
actness, but it is quite clear that it has had an appreciable influence
upon the course of judicial decisions.
Another source of difficulty has been the disposition to seek an
analogy in the rule of the prize courts as to commercial domicil un-
der exterritorial jurisdiction. The British prize courts have held
consistently that the neutral or enemy character of persons engaged
in trade in foreign countries under exterritorial protection is to be
determined by the character of the state which exercises such pro-
tection. The leading authority- on the point is Lord Stowell's fa-
mous judgment in The Indian Chief,' where it was held that the
neutral or enemy character of a person engaged in trade in the
Orient under the protection of a European association or factory
is" to be determined by the character of the association or factory.
Lord Stowell remarked that
"in-the East, from the oldest time, an immiscible character
has been kept up; foreigners are not admitted into the general
body and mass of the society of the nation; they continue
strangers and sojourners as all their fathers were-Doris
amara suam non intermiscudt undam; not acquiring any na-
tional character under the general sovereignty of the country,
and not trading under any recognized authority of their own
original country, they have been held to derive their present
character from that of the -association or factory, under
whose protection they live and carry on their trade."
'7
The modem application of Lord Stowell's principle has been made
during the recent war by the British prize courts for Egypt. In the
3 3 C. Rob. i2, 29.
4 z Rob. Eccl. 67, 80.
3 Br. & Col. P. C. 386, 388.
O3 C. Rob. 32, 22 (18oo).
S3 C. Rob. 12, 22, 29. See Piggott, Exterritoriality (new ed.), 222. Compare The
Eumacus, i Br. & Col. P. C. 605, 613 (1915).
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case of The Derfflinger (No. ),1 a neutral commercial domicil was
claimed for a German subject residing in China under German
consular jurisdiction; but it was held that an enemy subject cannot
acquire a commercial domicil outside the country of his allegiance
by residing abroad under the jurisdiction of his country's consular
courts. President Cator quoted the language of Lord Stowell with
approval, and continued:
"In those.days factories, as they were called, still flourished
in the Orient * * * Since that time the grouping has under-
gone a change. Communities which in those days were. not.
trading under any recognized authority of their own original
country have now sorted themselves out into communities
of different nations, definitely controlled by their home Gov-
ernments, which legislate for them in virtue of rights acquired
by custom or definitely conceded by native potentates. The
trading bond has given way to one of nationality. But al-
lowving for this difference, the words of Lord Stowell are
just as applicable in these days as they were more than a
hundred years ago. The waters of Alpheus still flow unde-
filed, and where European Powers enjoy the privilege of
ex-territorial jurisdiction their subjects never lose their na-
tive character. Each community continues its distinctive ex-
istence, governed by its own consuls and subject to the laws
of its mother country."0
President Cator was not inclined to assimilate commercial domicil
as a test of neutral or enemy character to civil domicil generally."0
A somewhat different attitude was taken in the later case of The
Littzow and The Koerber.1' It was claimed that goods shipped
8i Br. & Col P. C. 386 (ipis).
xa Br. & Col. P. C. 386, 388.
10 That he regarded the question of commercial domicil as essentially different from
that of civil domicil is shown by the following passage from his opinion: "From time to
time questions as to the sta us of British subjects in Cliina and the Ottoman Dominions
have come before our Courts, and it has been settled that no British subject can change
his legal domicile, by residence in any place where the Crown has ex-territorial authority.
That, as we know to our cost, owing to the great inconvenience which it has entailed upon
the British community, is, I think, the effect of In re Tootal's Trusts * * * approved of by
the Privy Council in Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra * * * These decisions, it is true, relate only to
the subtle and artificial doctrine of personal domicile which has been evolved by our
civil Courts for the purpose of determining xuestions relating principally, to probate and-
administration; and a legal domicile for the purpose of a Court of Probate is, I'need hard-
ly say, a very different thing from a commercial domicile for the purpose of a Prize
Court." iBr. & Col. P. C. 386, 389. The two cases cited by President Cator are dis-
cussed infra.
u i Br. & Col. P. C. 528 (1915).
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by German merchants in China should be regarded as neutral prop-
erty because the owners had acquired a neutral commercial domicil.
Counsel conceded that it might be impossible to acquire a civil domi-
cil under similar circumstances, but contended ihat the arguments
against civil domicil were not applicable because civil and conmer-
cial.domicil are fundamentally different. The Court held that com-
mercial domicil cannot be established under consular jurisdiction,
and expressed the opinion that to a considerable extent at least the
arguments against civil domicil may be applied to defeat a claim of
commercial domicil. Judge Grain concluded,
"Although I have been much impressed by the judgment in
Mather v. Cunningham 12 * * * and -the review of the British
cases in that judgment, nevertheless I am of opinion that at
the present time the British law is that neither a civil nor a
commercial domicil can be established by an individual who
is resident or carrying on business in a foreign land when his
country has been granted the privileges of extra-territorial-
ity."21
It is not necessary to consider here the usefulness in prize cases
of an analogy between civil and commercial domicil under exter-
ritorial jurisdiction. On the other hand it seems clear enough that
the rules of commercial domicil by which prize courts determine
neutral or enemy character do not furnish a helpful analogy in
solving the more difficult problem of civil domicil. Commercial and
civil domicil are fundamentally different.14 Indeed, the point would
be almost too obvious for comment if the prize cases had not been
invoked so persistently in arguing the question of civil domicil.
The anomalous notion of Anglo-Indian domicil has been the
source of much more serious confusion. This notion grew up dur-
ing the rule of the East India Company in India. British sub-
jects in the service of the Company in India were held to acquire
'
2 Discussed infra,
%S X Br. & Col. P. C. 528, 532. "It is clear from the cases Maltass v. Maltass ...
Tootal': Trusts, ire * * * and Abd-ul-Messil v. Farra * * * that in British law a civil
domicile cannot be established in countries where extra-territoriality runs." Ibid., 530.
14 See Dicey, Conflict of Laws, app., notes 3 and 4. "But suclj factories are not re-
garded as colonies or foreign countries for the purpose of domicil. There may be commer-
cial domicil there in times of war with reference to the law of capture, hut that is al-
together a different matter." Per Justice Chitty, in In re Tootal': Trusts, 23 Ch. . 532,
540. "'Commercial domicil' differs in so many respects from 'civil domicil' that I do not
think these cases useful in dealing with the present question." Per Lord justice Scrutton,
in Casdagli v. CasdagU, 87 L. J. P. 79, 89.
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what was called an Anglo-Indian domici.1 5 The doctrine is sum-
rearized in The Lairs of England as follows:
"An exception to the ordinary rules governing the acquisi-
tion of a domicil of choice formerly existed in the case of
British subjects in the service of the East India Company re-
siding in India for a period of service that was not fixed.
The government of the Company was regarded as a foreign
government, and entry into its service as imposing a duty
which was incompatible with the retention of an existing
domicil; and a presumption, which was not allowed to be
rebutted, was raised in favour of an intention consistent with
this duty. An Indian domicil was therefore acquired by mere
residence in India under these conditions, without regard to
the actual state of mind accompanying it, and in spite of the
fact that the majority of the Company's servants definitely
looked forward to their return. This anomalous domicil has
never been acquired by the servants of the Crown in India,
and since 1858 the mode in which an Indian domicil is ac-
quired has ceased to be exceptional." '
The domicil of British subjects not in the service of the East India
Company, who settled in India for the purpose of trade, was ot-in-
frequently referred to as Anglo-Indian, 17 and the distinction be-
tween the two kinds of cases was not always carefully observed. The
doctrine of Anglo-Indian domicil was admittedly anomalous. It lost
its practical importance after the establishment of direct British
rule in India. Curiously enough, it has been invoked as a precedent
in every case involving the question of domicil under consular juris-
diction.
Antipathy to the idea of Christian domicil in heathen countries
and appeals to false analogies, particularly to analogies with the
rule as to commercial domicil and with the doctrine of Anglo-Indian
domicil, contributed to produce a somewhat unusual confusion.
The conception of domicil was distorted, and the accumulated dicta
of distinguished judges became the foundation for the anomalous
rule laid down by the Court of Appeal in the Casdagli case. The
13 See Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229 (1790); Craigie v. Lewin, 3 Curt. 435 (1843);
Forbes v. Forbes, 23 L. _T. Ch. 724 (854); Hepburn v. Skirving, 9 W. R..764 (86x);
Jopp v. Wood, 34 L. 3. Ch. 212 (186i); Ex parte Cun"sngham, 13 Q. B. D. 418 (1884).
"VI, p. 190.17 See Cockrell v. Cockrell, 25 L. 3. Ch. 730 (z86); The Attorney General v. Fitz-
gerald. ibid.. 743 (x8S6); Lyall v. Paton, ibid., 746 (18S6); Allardice v. Onslow,, 33 L. 3.
Ch. 434 (i864).
MICHIGAN LAW REVI W
first case in which the acquisition of a domicil of choice under con-
sular jurisdiction was considered was Maltass. v. Maltass.18  The
testator was born and settled all his life at Smyrna. His father had
been domiciled at a remote period in England. The will was valid
under English law, but it was contended that the testator had been
domiciled in Turkey and that by Turkish law he could not dispose
of his property by will. Dr. Lushington remarked at the outset that
an inquiry-as to domicil would be unnecessary if it should appear
that, with respect to this particular- succession, the law of England
and the law of Turkey were the same; and in concluding his opinion
he said:
"I wish to observe that I am desirous not tobe supposed to
have givenffan opinion upon any question not necessary to be
decided in this case. My judgment therefore does not affect
the question of domicil.- If the deceased was in the legal
sense domiciled in Turkey, and if the law of domicil does
prevail, the law of Turkey in conformity with the treaty says
that in such case the sticcession to personal estate shall be
governed by the British law; if he was not domiciled in Tur-
.key but in England, then the law of England prevails proprio
szgore 9
I give no opinion, therefore, whether a British subject can
or cannot acquire a Tuikish domicil; but this I must say,-
I think every presumption is against the intention of British
Christian subjects voluntarily becoming domiciled in the do-
minions of the Porte. As'to British subjects, originally Mus-
sulmen, as' in the East Indies, or becoming Mussulmen, the
same reasoning does not apply to them as Lord Stowell has
said does apply in cases of a total and entire difference of
religion, customs, and habits.1
2 0
z Rob. Eccl. 67 (1844).
1 Westake's punctuation of this paragraph has been followed in preference to the
obviously defective punctuation of the report. Westlake, Private International Law(4 ed.), 38.
z Rob. Eccl. 67, 80. "In this enlightened age the doctrine of Immiscibility cannot
be accorded such weight as to establish a legal presumption against all other evidence tend-
ing to prove animus. In American-jurisprudence, at least, it should be allowed to slumber
with Quaker persecution, Salem witchcraft and other kindred dogmas. Since the dictum
of immiscibility was first declared, the world has experienced a revolution touching the
national, commercial and trade relations between the nations of the East and those of the
West. Our conclusion, therefore, upon the first proposition is that no sound reason can
be adduced against the practical application of the American law of domicil to Americans
residing in China, when the animus et factum are found to concur." Per justice Spear,
in Mather v. Cunningham, zo5 Me. 326, 341.
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It is evident that Dr. Lushington's remark on the subject of domicil
was dictum. The question of domicil under consular jurisdiction
was expressly left undecided.
The question might have been decided, had it been properly sub-
mitted, in the famous case of In re Tootal's T-rusts.21 The testator
was a British subject who had resided for a long period at Shanghai
and had manifested an undisputed animus manendi. The liability
of his personal estate to the English legacy duty depended upon his
domicil at death. On the one hand, an argument that the testator
had acquired a Chinese domicil would encounter Dr. Lushington's
dictum as to the presumption against an intention to acquire such a
domicil..2 2  On the other hand, an argument that the testator had
acquired an Anglo-Chinese domicil could be supported by an analogy
with the doctrine of Anglo-Indian domicil. It is perhaps not sur-
prising, although none the less unfortunate, that counsel elected the
latter alternative. Counsel admitted that the testator's domicil was
not Chinese, apparently meaning that he had not intended to subject
himself to the law applicable to Chinamen, and contended that his
domicil was. Anglo-Chinese, apparently meaning that he was sub-
ject to the law which applied to Englishmen in China.2s With regard
to the admission of counsel, Mr. Justice Chitty said:
"This admission was rightly made. The difference between
the religion, laws, manners, and customs of the Chinese and
of Englishmen is so great as to raise every presumption
against such a domicil, and brings the case within the prin-
ciples laid down by Lord Stowell in his celebrated judg-
ment in The Indian Chief, and by Dr. Lushington in Mal-
tass v. Malta.s:"z
It was held that the doctrine of Ang16-Indian domicil wa4s inapplica-
ble,25 that there was no such thing known to the law as Anglo-Chi-
= 23 Ch. D. 532 (r883). See Westlake, 'Domicile at a Chinese Treaty Port," in 9
Law Magazine and Review (4th series) 363-382.
It would seem that the existence of exterritorial jurisdiction ought to make it eas-
ier to find the necessary anitus, for in selecting a new domicil of choice the fact that his
affairs would be governed by the law of his own country would tend naturally to influence
a person in favor of the new domicil. See s8 Univ. of Penn. Law Review 543, 348.
*'The argument was summarized by Justice Chitty in the opinion as follows: "Upon
these facts it is contended for the Petitioners that there exists at the foreign port of
Skanghai an organised community of British subjects independent of- Chinese law and
exempt from Chinesi jurisdiction, and not amenable to the ordinary tribunals of this
country, but bound together by law which is English law, no doubt, but English law with
this difference, that the English revenue laws, do not form part of it, and that by residence
and choice the testator became a member of this community, and as such acquired an
Anglo-Chinese domicil." 23 Ch. D. S32, 536.
2123 Ch. D. 532, 534.
's "At Shanghai there is a British consul, residing there by virtue of the treaties, but
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nese domicil, and that the testator must have retained his English
domicil of origin. In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice Chitty
said:
"There is no authority that I am aware of in English law
that an individual can become domiciled as a member of a
community which is not the community possessing the su-
preme or sovereign territorial power.' 'se
When taken out of its context, this remark,¢ has been the source of
considerable embarrassment; but, considered in relation to the pre-
cise point which Mr. Justice CrITTY had to decide, it seems to be
free from difficfilty. In any event, the question of the acquisition
of domicil in China by a person enjoying consular protection was not
squarely submitted to the court. The most important question was
eliminated by the admission of counsel, and the court was asked and
refused to find not a Chinese but an anomalois Anglo-Chinese dom-
icil analogous to Anglo-Indian domicil. Tootal's Trusts is at best
a frail support for-the decision of the Court of Appeal in Casdagli
v. Cawsdagli.
* The authority of Abd-ul-Messih v. Chukri Farra , 27 in which Mr.
,Justice Chitty's dictum was approved by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, is still more dubious. The testator in this case
was born at Bagdad an Ottoman subject. In early life he went to
India, where he remained for a considerable period. Later he went
to Jeddah, and afterwards to Cairo, where he lived for twenty-seven
years under the protection of the British Government. On his death
the question arose as to the law which should determine his power
of testacy and the distribution of his effects. It was argued that
by making his permanent home in Cairo under British ,protection
the testatoi had acquired an Anglo-Egyptian domicil, or at least an
Egyptian as distinguished from a Turkish domicil. The latter point
was not afgued in the consular court, however, and was dismissed
very briefly by the Judicial Committee on appeal. The Juaticial
Committee found Tootars Trusts "an authority directly in point,"
and held that an Ottoman subject could not acquire an Anglo-
Egyptian domicil of choice by residing in Egypt, then Ottoman ter-
ritory, under British protection, because donlicil depends on locality
and not on membership in a protected community. Lord Watson
there is no government by British authority existing there, and there is nothing which can
be regarded as a separate or independent Government, and the analogy which the Pe-
titioners seek to establish with an Anglo-Indian domicil is not made out." 23 Ch. D. 532,
538.
53 23 Ch. D. 532, 538. See Westlake, Private International Law (4 ed.), 38-319.,
2 123 App. Cas. 431 (1888).
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remarked that "residence in a foreign country, without subjection to
its municipal laws and customs, is therefore ineffectual to create a
new domicil;" and also that
"residence in a foreign State, as a privileged member of an ex-
territorial community, although it may be effectual to destroy
a residential domicil acquired elsewhere, is ineffectual to cre-
ate a new domicil or choice." 28
The authority of Tootal's Trusts on the point at issue in Abd-ul-
Massik v, Chkiri Farra has never been satisfactorily explained. The
two cases apparently had little in common. The passages quoted
from Lord Watson's opinion seem to have gone somewhat beyond
the point to be decided.
.The suggestion that residence under consular jurisdiction should
be ineffectual to create a new domicil of choice was not favorably
received among the jurists. William Edward Hall regarded the
law as settled by Tootal's Trusts and Abd-ul-Messih v.,Chukri Far-
ra, but regretted that a change in the law had not been made by
Order in Council.
"It is perhaps to be regretted that a change in the law is not
made which a short Order in Council could easily effect.
Anglo-Oriental domicil has its reasonable, it may almost be
said, its natural place. Conflicts between the differing laws
of England, of Scotland, of the various self-governing col-
onies, are inevitable within British jurisdiction in the East;
but it is unnecessary to multiply the points of collision. So
long as persons have not identified themselves with the life'
of a new community, they must each keep his own law; but
as soon as they have shown their wish and intention to cut
themselves adrift from the association of birth, they prove
their indifference to the personal law attendant.on their dom-
icil of origin; there is, therefore, no reason why simplicity
and unity of law should not be gained for British subjects
by attributing community in the laws of England to all of
European blood."2 9
The late Professor Westlake regarded the whole question as un-
settled, and thought that it called for further examination by the
House of Lords or the Privy Council.80 Sir Francis Piggott,.whose
" 13 App. Cas. 431, 439, 445. The case was cited with approval, although the point
under consideration was not involved, in Abdallah v. Rickards, 4 T. L. R. 622 (1888).
"Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, x8o-z86, 184.
" Private International Law (4 ed.), 311-322," 32r. See also 9 Law M'agazine and
Review (4th series) 363-382.
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opinion is especially valuable because, of his experience as Chief
Justice of Hong Kong, did not think that Tootal's Trusts had pro-
moted a final soltition of the problem and he expressed the opinion
that when the question was again raised it would be found that "the
principles established by the most recent cases necessitate a re-con-
sideration of the law laid down on this subject by Mr. justice
Chitty,"' 1 . A more recent study of 'the subject by Mr. Charles H.
Huberich leads its author to the following conclusion:
"The acquisition of a domicile in a country granting exter-
ritorial privileges is governed by the same principles of law
as the acquisition of a domicile in other countries. Where
the requisite factumr and animus are shown to exist there is
no valid reason why an Englishman or an American should
not be held to acquire a domicile in China. In respect of all
matters which private international law refers to the law of
the domicile'he would be governed by the Chinese law, the
law of the territorial sovereign. The law to which he would
be subject would be none the less the law of China because
it provides that persons of British and American nationality
shall be governed by such laws as their respective countries
may enact to goven their nationals in China."32
The suggestion that a domicil of choice cannot be acquired under
consular jurisdiction has been repudiated in the only American
jurisdictions where the question has been raised. In the case of In
re cllen's Will,8" before the United States Court for China, the tes-
tator was born in Georgia, moved to China when twenty-four years
of age, and lived there for twenty-seven years, until his death, en-
gaged in his labors as a missionary. His family was reared in China
and his estate, consisting solely of personal property, was accumu-
/lated there. He expressed an intention on several occasions to make-
China his permanent home, but never abandoned his American
citizenship. It was held that the testator had acquired an "extrater-
ritorial domicil"' 4 in China, and that the administration of his es-
SUExtertoriality (new ed.), 2x6b-23s, 224, 232-
='M"Domicile in Countries Granting Exterritorial Privileges to Foreigners," 24 Law
Quarterly Review 440-448, 447; also 31 ibid. 447-450.
1' Shanghai Term, August, 19o7, printed in r American Journal of International Law
1029.
9 The term "extraterritorial domicil" was unfortunate, and has been criticized in the
later American cise. "We wish to say, however, that we do not agree with judge Wilttey
in employing the name "extraterritorial domicil." It appears to be inconsistent with the
fundamental idea of domicil, which, as we have endeavored to show, is a relation between
an individual and a particular locality or country. The fact that the law governing the
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tate 9hould be determined by the common law which Congress had
authorized the United States Court for China to apply. Judge Wil-
fley said,
"We can see no good reason for holding that a citizen of
the United States cannot be domiciled in China. Mr. Justice
Chitty's decision destroys in their application to China all
'the definitions of domicil contained in the books. It ignores
both of the essential elements of residence and intention * * *
It requires a greater stretch of the imagination and the adop-
tion of a greater fiction of law to hold that a person can be
domiciled in a country where he does not reside and has no
intention of residing at any future time than to hold that a
citizen of a foreign State can acquire an exterritorial domicil
in a community which is not the community possessing the
sovereign territorial power. Every consideration of reason
and convenience demands that the American law of domicil
be applied by American Courts in China."3 5
The same question was submitted to the Maine Supreme Court in
Mather v. Cunningham.81 The testator was born in Waldo County,
Maine, but lived most of his life at Shanghai. His will was proved
before the United States Consul at Shanghai. Two brothers filed
a petition in the Probate Court of Waldo County, Maine, for ad-
ministration of the estate as intestate property, contending that the
decedent could not acquire a domicil at Shanghai, that he retained
his domicil of origin, and that by the law of Maine the will was in-
valid. It was held that domicil under consular protection is to be
determined by the same rules of law which control the acquisition of
domicil elsewhere, that the testator had acquired a Chinese domicil,
and that his will was properly sustained under the common law as
administered by the American Consular Court.
In this state of the English and American authorities the precise
question under consideration was squarely submitted to an English
court, for the first tinle, it may be noted, in the case of Casdagli v.
Casdagli.87 Demetrius Casdagli was born in England in 1872 of
naturalized British parents.. Most of his life has been spent in
Egypt, where he has resided continuously since 1895, and where he
was married to a woman of Greek nationality in 19o5. In his will,
particular locality is extraterritorial, does not make the domicil extraterritorial, since it
is immaterial upon the question of domicil from what source the law is proclaimed, as
before shown." Mather v. Cunningham, zos Me. 326, 346.
8r American Journal of International Law 1029, 1037.
so5 Me. 326 (gog).
18 7 L. J. P.7 3 (1917).
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drawn in I9IO, he described-himself as "a merchant, a British-born
subject having a domicil in Egypt." Throughout his residence in
Egypt, Casdagli has been registered at the British consulate as a
British-born subject. The British Consular Court in Egypt has no
jurisdiction to dissolve marriages. In 1916, Mrs. Casdagli petitioned
the English High Court'for a divorce. The Court's jurisdiction was
denied on the ground that the respondent was not domiciled in Eng-
-land and had never had a matrimonial domicil there. It was answer-
ed that the respondent had never lost his English donicil of origin.
Casdagli's actual residence in Egypt and his animus manendi were
established to the court's satisfaction. Justice Horridge said, "In
this case I think it is abundantly proved that the respondent has,
apart from extra-territorial rights, voluntarily fixed his sole or
chief residence in Egypt, with the intention of continuing to reside
there for an unlimited time."38 The real issue of the case, therefore,
was whether the possession by Casdagli as a British subject of ex-
territorial rights rendered him incapable of acquiring an Egyptian
domicil. Justice Horridge came somewhat reluctantly to the con-
clusion that he was bound by Tootal's Trusts andAbd-ul-Messih v.
Chukri Farra,5 and held that Casdagli's residence and aninius man-
endi in Egypt as a member of the exterritorial community were in-
effectual to create a new Egyptian domicil of choice. This decision
was affirmed by Swinfen Eady, L. J., and Warrington, L. J., in the
Court of Appeil; Scrutton, L. J., dissenting.40
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Casdagli v. Casdagli appar-
ently rests upon the principle that domicil requires, not only the fact
of residence and the animus manendi, but also what may be describ-
ed as a normal relation to the laws of the country of residence. Of the
case of Mather v. Cunningham, Swinfen Eady, L. J. says, "This case
is not consistent with the view of domicil adopted and acted upon by
English Courts. A person, settling in a country where ex-territorial
Wy L7 . P. P73, 76.
W Justice Horridge said: "It may be that if this case had been presented to the Court
free from authority, I should have felt there was great force in the views expressed by
certain jurists and in the American case on the matters dealt with in Toota.s Trusts, * * *
and I might have come to a conclusion which, having regard to Toota's Trusts * * * and
Abd-ul-Messil, v. Chukri Farra, * * * would have been a wrong decision. It may, indeed,
be desirable at the present time that Britons retaining their position as British subjects
should nevertheless be entitled-to settle down in foreign territory and enter into the life,
and take part in the institutions of other countries, and to subject themselves to the local
laws of those countries, which laws include regulations for their special protection. I
think, however, as the decision of Mr. Justice Chitty which affects personal status is a
decision given in x883, and as it is supported by the great authority of the judgment of
Lord Watson in the Privy Council, I am bound to follow these cases and hold that the
act on petition fails upon the third objection raised by the petitioner." 87 L. J. P. 73, 78-
' 87 L-. J. P. 79.
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privileges are granted, and who is governed by the law of his domicil
of origin, cannot be said to have attracted to himself the local mUmi-
cipal law, when the local law is by treaty expressly excluded from
applying to him." 41 And Warrington, L. J., declares that "domicil
in its legal meaning is clearly something more than the mere fact of
physical residence, coupled with the animus manendi. It connotes
also a legal relation to the laws of the country of residence by which
questions relating to the personal status of- the individual are de-
tennined. 2
The notion that domicil requires actual residence, the animus
nmanendi, and a normal relation to the laws of the country of resi-
dence involves, in the opinion of the present writer, an unnecessary
confusion of domicil with lex domicilii. Domicil is a legal relation-
ship between person and place.48 "Domicil of choice," said Lord
Westbury, in Udny v. Udty, "is a conclusion or inference which the
law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or
chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing
to reside there for an unlimited time." 4' The requisites for a dom-
icil of choice are (i) the fact of residence, and (2) the animus man-
endi. "The factum required is a change of residence, voluntarily as-
sumed, and permanent in character; the animus required is an in-
tention to settle in a new country as a permanent residence."'45 "It
is plain," said Justice Spear, in Mather 'v. Cunningham, "that it is the
place, not the local laws, that becomes of paramount importance in
determining the question of domicil. Where, not under what laws,
do the animus et factum concur?' 6 The lex domicilii, on the other
hand, is the law which is applied in the place of domicil. Normally
it is administered by the local authority, but there is no reason why
it may not come from a dual source and be administered partly by
local and partly by exterritorial authority.
The conception of domicil and the lex domicilji ought never to
be confused. The distinction between them becomes especially im-
portant when dealing with a subject.like domicil under consular
jurisdiction where the character of the lex domiciii is somewhat ano-
malous. The importance of the distinction is suggested in the fol-
"t 87 L. I-. P. 79, 8x.
2 "87 L. . P. 79, 83.
3 See Bell v. Kennedy. L RI H. L. (SC.) 307 (1868); Udny v. Udny, L. R. z H. ,.
(Sc.) 44z (869); The Laws of England, VI, 182-196; Dicey, Law of Domicil, 33z ff.;
N. W. Hoyles, "Domicile," 48 Canadian Law Journal 474-489.SL. R. i H. I. (Sc.) 441, 4S8.
"Hoyles, in 48 Canadian Law Journal 474, 477.
"zos Me. 326, 336.
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lowing passages from the dissenting opinion of Lord Scrutton in the
Casdaqli case.
"The first stage of the question seemg to be: Is there a
domicil or permanent home ?-which depends on the fact of
residence and the intention to continue to reside. The law of
England generally determines the status of a person, who may
be contended to be subject to various laws which conflict-as
the lex, domicilii, the law of this national character, the lex
icci actus or soltionis-by the lex domicilil. The second
stage of the enquiry is: Is there a lex domicilii which the
English Courts will recognise? * * * The law of the domicil
would appear to be the law which the Sovereign of the domi-
cil would administer in the case of the domiciled person. If
so, can it make any difference whether the Sovereign of the
domicil administers the law directly, or allows another Sov-
ereign by granf to exercise part of his sovereignty by admin-
istering such law as he pleases in Courts which the Sovereign
of the domicil allows to.exist in his territory? The law ap-
pears still to be the law of the domicil, allowed to be admin-
inistered in the country of the domicil by the sovereign power
of that country, whose consent is necessary for its adminis-
tration. * * * As a matter of principle apart from authority, I
am unable to see why the fact that the Sovereign of a countty
has granted to another country the privilege of exercising
jurisdiction over its subjects within his dominions, according
to its own law, should prevent a subject of the latter country,
who resides and intends permanently to reside in the former
country, from acquiring a domicil there. He will have a lex
dornicili--namely, the law which the Sovereign of the coun-
try allows to be applied to him by the Courts which that Sov-
ereign allows to exist. * * * Where the territory of residence
belongs to a Sovereign, who grants or allows a certain law to
exist in it for certain persons, I can see no reason in principle
why there should not be a domicil and a ex domnicilii."47
If the confusion of domicil and lex domicitii is objectionable, as it
seems clearly enough to be, then hyphenated descriptions of domicil
under consular jurisdiction ought to be abandoned at once and for
all. The terms Anglo-Chinese, Anglo-Turkish, etc. have had their
distinguished proponents.- "Now it would seem convenient," said
4T 87 L. J. P. 79, 87. It is impossible to do justice to the dissenting opinion in the
Catdagli case by quoting extracts. It deserves to be read in extenso.
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the late Professor Westlake, "that the domicile in such a case should
be denoted by a compound name, of which one element should indi-
cate the territory and the other the community." 48 William Edward
Hall defended the same nomenclature4 9 Compound names are
practically inseparable, however, from a distorted conception of dom-
icil.5o While they may be useful in describing the lex domici'ii under
consular jurisdiction, it is submitted, with all deference to the dis-
tinguished authority of Hall and Westlake, that as applied to domicil
they are at least misleadilig and superfluous. The multiplication of
technical terms is "an evil only to be justified by necessity," and dom-
icil is domicil, from however many sources the lex domicilii may be
derived.
The idea of a hyphenated domicil compounded of relation to
locality and membership in a community was repudiated in Tootal's
Trusts."' Mr. Justice Chitty's dictum suggested another query, how-
ever, as to whether domicil can be acquired under what may be des-
cribed as a hyphenated lex domicilii. Does the partition of jurisdic-
tion between the territorial and the exterritorial authorities in case
of consular jurisdiction constitute an insuperable obstacle to the ac-
quisition of domicil? It was intimated in Tootal's Trusts and Abd-
ul-Messih v. Chukri Farra that such an obstacle inheres in the na-
ture of consular jurisdiction. Mr. Charles H. Huberich has sug-
gested that the difficulty arose out of an erroneous conception of ex-
territoriality. He believes that -it is possible to regard the state
which concedes exterritorial privileges as supreme over all persons
and things within its territorial limits and to explain exterritorial
jurisdiction as a mere delegation of authority. He concludes,
"The legislative power of China extends to all persons and
things within the territorial limits of the Einpire; the British
459 Law Magazine and Review (4th series) 363, 372. See also his Private Interna-
tional Law (4 ed.), 311-322.
4 Foreign jurisdiction of the British Crown, i84-i86.
0* This is well illustrated by Hall's defence of the notion of Anglo-Oriental domicil.
He says: "Theoretically the conception of such a domicil is unobjectionable if once the
mind is cleared of the notion, at present dominant, that domicil is the creature of place
and intention alone. In Europe it is so, because residence in a place implies subjection
to the common territorial law, and to no other; in the East it is not necessarily so, be-
cause residence there implies subjection to the law of one or other of several different
commhnities the personal laws of which receive equal recognition from the territorial
sovereign power. Association with place is necessary to domicil; but it is not always the
sole determinant factor. In any case, even if the conception of domicil here suggested
be anomalous, the convenience of giving effect to it is large enough to excuse a certain
sacrifice of logical principle." Op. cit, x86.
u Strictly speaking, that was all that Tootal'r Trusts decided, and on that point it is
submitted that the decision was correct.
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Parliament in legislating for British nationals in China acts
merely under a delegation of authority. Such laws are op-
erative within the territory of China only,because China rec-
ognizes them as part of the law of the land. The Chinese law
subjects certain persons owing allegiance to a foreign govern-
ment to rules of law which may differ from those that are
applied to persons of Chinese nationality, just as the common
law subjects certain transactions having their origin in for-
eign countries to rules of law which may differ from those
that are applied to transactions taking place in the forum.
Nor is the principle affected by the circumstance that this
law is administered by officials appointed by a foreign gov-
ernment." 52
In other words, the partition of jurisdiction which seems to have
troubled the English courts does not really exist. This explanation
appears-to have been approved in Mather v. Cunntingham, where it
was said,
"The ownership of the soil, therefore, controls the estab-
lishment of all local laws. Without consent of the owner,
no extraterritorial law can be enacted within an independent
jurisdiction,-or extended to it. China is independent. It
never released its ownership to the soil of Shanghai. Its
sovereignty over its territory was )retained * * * whatever
laws may have been extended by Congress to the Province of
Shanghai 'are operative, not upon American soil, but upon
the territory of the Chinese Empire. How do these laws
reach there? By treaty, permission of the Emperor. ***
Although the Emperor had supehded some of the Chinese
laws and permitted the extension of American law to the
territory, yet the source of the law was the Emperor who
had never released his sovereignty over the soil."'a
The above explanation was in no way essential to the decision in
Mather v. Cunningham, however, for the decision was based upon
the principle that domicil is oindependent of any distinction with
respect to the source of the le: domicili.
Consular jurisdiction was not explained as a mere delegation of
authority in the American case of Alenys Will.54 The English
22 Law Quarterly Review 44o, 448. Compare Westlake, 9 Law Magazine and
Review (4th series) 368.
0 105 Me. 326, 337, 338. The opinion is not as clear on this point, however, as the
extracts quoted above might seem to indicate.5
' judge Wilfley said, "while the Emperor of China exercises nominal sovereignty over
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cases have insisted throughout that the concession -of exterritorial
privileges involves a real partition of jurisdiction.55 The most
recent expression on this point is found in the Casdagli case, where
it was said,
"It is not by reason of any local law that a British protected
person in Egypt is to be immune from local law. and that
his own law is to be applied to him by His Britannic M fajes-
ty's Courts, sitting in Egypt, on Egyptian soil, but deriving
their authority from His Majesty; such jurisdiction is indeed
in derogation of- the power of the Sovereign of the country
conferring such rights * * * and the law administered in Egypt
by His Britannic Majesty's Courts is English law and not
Egyptian local law. 6 * * * With all respect to the American
judges who, in Mather v. Cunningham * * * expressed a con-
trary view, I am of opinion that the Consular Court in
Egypt is one of the King's -Courts, that its jurisdiction is de-
rived from the King, and not from the Ruler of Egypt, and
that the law administered therein is strictly the law of Eng-
land, and is not to be regarded as a branch of the law of
Egypt.$57
It would seem that the English courts are abundantly, justified in
insisting that the law stick to realities. The theory of delegated au-
thority is false to the facts. Moreover, it is superfluous. The diffi-
uliy has not arisen out of an erroneous conception of consular juris-
diction. It has arisen out of a distorted idea of domicil which, it
has been suggested, seems to have had its inception in a confusion of
domicil with lex domicilii. Let the importance of preserving a clear
distinction between domicil and the lex domicilii be fully understood,
all Chinese territory including that occupied by the nationals of the United States and
Great Britain, yet the jurisdiction of these two countries over their own citizens who
reside in China is, for all practical purposes, as full and complete as if China were in fact
territory belonging to these nations." i American journal of International Law zo29,
1034.
53In Tootal's Trusts, justice Chitty said, "The soveregnty over the soil at Shanghai
remains vested in the Emperor of China with this exception, that he has by treaty bound
himself to permit British subjects to reside at the place for purposes of commerce only,
without interference on his part, and to permit the British Crown to exercise jurisdiction
there over its own subjects, but over no other persons." 23 Ch. D. 532, 539. See also
Papayanni v. The Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, 2 Moore P. C., N. S.
x6x (z863); Imperial Japanese Government v. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Naviga.
tion Company, 64 L. J. P. C. xo7, xr2, 113 (1895); Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
v. Charlesworth, Pilling and Co., 7o L. J. P. C. 25, 28, 29 (19o). Compare the language
used in the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 189o, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37.
" Swinfen Eady, L. J., 87 L. J. P. 79, 8x.
"Warrington, L. J., 87 L. J. P. 79, 83, 84. See Scrutton, L. J., ,Vid., 9!, 92.
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and there should be no difficulty in admitting the possibility of domi-
cil under consular protection. The lex domicihi will have a dual
source, but that is a phenomenon by no means entirely unknown to
the law. Something of the sort exists in case of federations, con-
federations, and loosely constituted empires. In international re-
lationships phenomena that are similar in some respects at least
result from military occupation, prolonged intervention, protection,
financial supervision of debtor states, the administration of terri-
tory, the leasing of territory, and divers limitations of the nature of
servitudes. There is no reason why a partition of jurisdiction which
involves a lex domicilii derived from a dual source should be re-
garded as an insuperable obstacle to the acquisition of domicil.
The English conception of consular jurisdiction is sound enough,
but the English rule which denies the possibility of acquiring a
domicil of choice under consular jurisdiction is ationce illogical and
impractical. Its consequences have never been sufficiently consider-
ed. A British subject cannot acquire a domicil of choice abroad un-
der consular protection. He cannot have a. matrimonial domicil un-
der consular protection. A fortiori his children born under' ex-
territorial jurisdiction can have no domicil of origin at their place of
birth. And so on for as many generations as one chooses to postu-
late. This is not mere idle speculation for there are many British
families which have been settled for several generations under
British consular jurisdiction. Domicil in such cases must be domi-
cil of some ancestor. The manifold inconveniences necessarily in-
cident to the application of the doctrine of ancestral domicil are too
obvious for comment.5" Although residence and the anintus nanten-
di in an exterritorial community cannot destroy a domicil of origin,
they must, from the very circumstances of the case, destroy a pre-
vious domicil of choice, since the conditions under which that domi-
cil arose have been terminated. Having destroyed a previous domi-
cil of choice, they operate to revive a pre-existing domicil of origin.
although there is, ex hypothesi, no animl~us revertendi to that domicil.
In other words, we have what Sir Francis Piggott has aptly described
as "a mechanical contrivance for supplying a want of definite in-
tention" applied to a case where there are definite intention and
every ingredient and every idea involved in the assumption of a
new domicil.59
It has been suggested that there may be other jurisdictional anom-
alies in which the lex domicilii is derived from a dual source. If the
" See Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, x8s; Westlake, 9 Law Magazine
and Review (4th series) 374.
1 Exterritoriality (new ed.), 23o.
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point were raised, would consistence require that the doctrine of-
Casdagli v. Casdagfi be applied to such situations? There are
other types of cases in which the matter of domicil presents a prob-
lem of considerable difficulty and importance. Will the conception of
domicil approved in the Court of Appeal be extended to such cases ?so
Is it too much to say that eventually the English courts must consider
this problem on itc merits and with more or less disregard for the an-
cicnt doctrine of immiscibility, the analogies with commercial and
Anglo-Indian domicil, and the accumulated dicta of distinguished
judges. A generation has elapsed since Tootal's Trusts was decided
and the problem still requires further examination in the House of
Lords or the Privy Council. Meanwhile Americ'n courts will find
in the ratio decidendi of Mather v. Cunningham a satisfactory prin-
ciple and precedent.
EDWIN D. DICKINSON.
Ann Arbor, Mich.
0 Compare, for example, the problems involved in In re Johnson, 72 L. J. Ch. 682
(z9o3); In re Bowes, 22 Times L.IR. 711 (x9o6).
NoT:-Since the above article was written it has come to the author's notice that
the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Casdagli v. Casdagli was reversed in the
House of Lords October 28, 1918. International Law Notes, Dec., x918, p. x69; The So-
licitor's Journal and Weekly Reporter, Nov. 2, x918, p. 39. The opinions given in the
House of Lords are not yet available. Such summaries as have been published indicate
that a satisfactory solution has at last been found for the problem of domicil under con-
sular jurisdiction in the English law. The decision of the House of Lords will be dis-
cussed in a later paper when the opinions become available.
